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1. Introduction
Throughout this article, we analyse the main implications for European 
intermediary holding companies in light of  the Court of  Justice of  the EU (CJEU, 
hereinafter) landmark decisions of  February 26th of  2019,1 addressed as “Danish cases”, 
where the Court established a simultaneously relevant and complex doctrine on the 
interpretation of  anti-abuse rules and principles, derived from Directives 2003/123/
EC “Parent-Subsidiary” and  2003/49/CE, “Interest and Royalties”. 
Those rulings of  February 26th of  2019, depict the current approach of  CJEU 
case law on anti-abuse rules which is in line with post-BEPS international trend which 
changes the divide between legitimate tax planning and abusive and artificial tax 
arrangements. In connection with that, it is important to highlight the implications this 
case law has on the interpretation of  domestic anti-abuse rules, whenever they refer to 
the application of  EU law. 
Based on what was said above, one has to acknowledge that the doctrine set 
forward by the CJEU in the “Danish cases” impacts significantly on the general concept 
of  abusive tax practice and will also produce consequences on the use of  “intermediary 
holding companies” located in EU Member States, in regard to the tax exemption 
entitlements provided by European Directives.
2. CJEU’s doctrine regarding the “Danish Cases” in respect of  
interpretation of  parent/subsidiary and interest and royalties 
EU tax Directives
The February 26th of  2019 rulings concern a set of  cases relating to different 
situations in which Danish tax authorities refused to exempt interest and dividends 
payments, as provided by the Parent/Subsidiary Directive (2003/123) and the Interest 
and Royalty Directive (2003/49) (the “Directives”), on the ground that they deemed 
those payments related to abusive situations was not covered within the purview of  the 
rules embodied in  the Directives.
Danish tax authorities claimed that refusing exemption of  interest and dividends 
payments made to “intermediate holding companies” (controlled by residents of  third 
States) was justified and consistent with anti-abuse rules set forward by the Directives. 
The position of  Danish tax authorities led to a reference for a Preliminary Ruling 
concerning the interpretation of  the beneficial owner rule enclosed in the Interest 
and Royalty Directive (Art.º 1), and the general anti-abuse rule embodied in Arts.1.2 
of  the Parent/ Subsidiary Directive (2003/123) and 5 of  the Interest and Royalty 
Directive (2003/49).
In basic terms, the doctrine adopted by the CJEU can be summarised as follows: 
a)  the beneficial owner clause laid down in Directive 2003/49 represents a 
material requirement to be proved by taxpayers, and verified by tax authorities; 
b) the beneficial owner clause laid down in the Interest and Royalty Directive 
2003/49 (Art.º 1.1) must be given an autonomous interpretation based on how 
it is regulated by the Directive (Art.º 1.4), taking into account its rationale and the 
European Union goals, such as eliminating double taxation and ensuring  equality 
1 CJEU ruling of  February 26 of  2019, joined cases C-115/16, C-118/16, C-119/16 and C-299/16, N 
Luxembourg 1, X Denmark A/S, C Denmark I, Z Denmark ApS v. Skatteministeriet, on the potential abuse 
of  the Directive 2003/49. And CJEU ruling of  February 26 of  2019, cases C-116/16 and C-117/16, T 
Denmark and Denmark Aps, on the potential abuse of  the Directive 2003/123, Parent/Subsidiary.
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of  tax treatment between national and cross-border transactions. In connection 
with this, it is important to observe that even if  the domestic concept of  beneficial 
owner is not relevant, considering that domestic concepts have a different scope, 
OECD’s soft-law represented by the OECD Model and its commentaries on the 
concept of  beneficial, on the contrary, represent a valuable interpretation tool, 
due to the fact that the Proposal Directive that preceded the current Directive 
drew inspiration from OECD materials;2 the use of  OECD soft-law was not 
considered to lack democratic legitimacy; 
c) the beneficial owner clause laid down in the Interest and Royalty 
Directive is independent from the general principle of  EU law that asserts that 
abusive practices are prohibited, in the sense that they have different subjective 
requirements and diverse burden of  proof  rules, being, therefore, compatible and 
complementary;  the absence of  a general or specific domestic anti-abuse rule, 
vis-a-vis  Directive abuse, does not limit or exclude whatsoever the possibility of  
having tax authorities controlling the existence of  abusive arrangements in light 
of  the Directive and denying tax advantages derived from those arrangements 
whenever evidence of  abusive tax practices is identified according to the 
conditions laid down by the CJEU (Italmoda and Cussens rulings); 
d) the absence of  beneficial owner rule in the Parent/Subsidiary Directive 
(2003/123) does not mean that abuse and “Directive Shopping” cannot be tackled, 
considering that said Directive includes a set of  rules that allow tax authorities 
to have a broad scope of  powers to investigate potential abusepractices; also the 
general principle of  EU law prohibiting abusive practices is also implied by the 
context of  the Parent/Subsidiary Directive; it is not clear-cut whether the fact the 
recipient of  dividends is not the beneficial owner implies by itself  that an abusive 
situation occurs;3 
2 We have stressed that the CJEU does not seem to validate in these rulings a dynamic interpretation 
in restrictive sense in regard to the use of  OECD Model commentaries to the concept of  beneficial 
owner (see: CFE, “Opinion Statement ECJ-TF 2/2019 on the CJEU decisions of  26 February 2019 
in Cases C-15/16, C-118/16 and 299/16, N Luxemburg I et al, and cases C-116/16 and C-117/17, T 
Denmark et al., concerning the beneficial ownership requirement and the anti-abuse principle in the 
company tax directives”, June 2019, p. 17, and 19). 
3 Actually, the doctrine advocated by the CJEU in the February 26, 2019 ruling (cases C-116/96 T 
Denmark, and C-117/16 and Denmark), is not clear in that regard; however, we consider that the fact an 
intermediary company is not the “beneficiary owner” for the purpose of  the application of  the Parent/
Subsidiary Directive is merely an indicium (very relevant) that an arrangement made with the purpose 
of  benefiting from the exemption derived from art.º 5 of  the said Directive is in place. The CJEU, 
throughout the decision (because it does not allude to other rulings that follow the same reasoning), 
refers to tax authorities gathering evidence on the abusive practice occurrence in light of  a global analysis 
of  the facts based on a set of  indicia of  an objective and consistent artificiality, allowing, at the end of  
the day, the submission of  evidence of  the contrary by the taxpayer. The CJEU, in its turn, seems to 
recognise the legitimacy of  intermediary holding companies which undertake a real economic activity 
and are established in the EU (paras.103 and 104) or that have commercial purpose (para.110). On 
the contrary, in situations where dividends paid by an European subsidiary are transferred to an entity 
(beneficial owner) which meets the Parent/ Subsidiary Directive requirements through a conduit that, in 
reality, represents an artificial arrangement close to a company simulation (lacking economic substance 
and commercial purpose) we would be in the presence of  abusive situations that seem to go beyond 
the scope of  Parent/Subsidiary Directive; this interpretation, in our opinion, is compatible with CJEU 
ruling on Parent/Subsidiary Directive (C-116/16 and C-117/16); the concept of  beneficial owner 
would not be used in a technical sense (OECD meaning), but with the purpose of  addressing a conduit 
artificially interposed to achieve a Company simulation (in similar terms: B. Larking, “CJEU Decisions 
on Tax Avoidance and Conduits: More Questions than Answers”, TNI, July 1, 2019, p. 30). On the other 
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e) intermediary companies (conduit companies) interposed in a chain of  
companies belonging to a group  or a private equity fund do not qualify 
as beneficiary owners whenever taxpayers do not manage to demonstrate that 
those entities have real powers to make decisions, control, use or have enjoyment 
of  the income received (interest, dividends or royalties);  the expression “beneficiary 
owner” designates an entity which actually benefits from the income (interest) that 
is paid to it;4
f) the application of  the Directive 2003/49 is effective when taxpayers 
demonstrate sufficiently that the ultimate beneficial owner (or “second 
level beneficiary owner”) to which income is actually transferred, by the first 
recipient, has control over the use and enjoyment of  the income and fulfils 
the remaining requirements laid down in the Directive (e.g., tax residence, legal 
form, etc.);  tax authorities may refuse the benefits granted by a Directive if  that 
Directive includes beneficial owner rules, and taxpayers fail to demonstrate they 
meet the requirements laid down in those rules; in those situations tax authorities, 
as long as they justify in a well sustained manner that requirements were not met 
by taxpayers, do not need to identify the ultimate or real beneficial owner of  the 
income; 
g) It is settled case-law that there is, in EU law, a general legal principle that 
EU law cannot be relied on for abusive or fraudulent ends (CJEU rulings 
on the following cases Halifax, Cadbury Schweppes, Cussens, and Kofoed, 
among others); said principle requires that Member State must refuse to grant 
the benefit of  the provisions of  EU law where they are relied upon not with 
a view of  achieving the objectives of  those provisions, but with the aim of  
benefiting from an advantage in EU law, although the conditions for benefiting 
from that advantage are fulfilled only formally (e.g. cases of  non-genuine 
commercial operations); in the tax field, as a consequence of  that principle, 
abusive tax practices are prohibited; 
end, in the CJEU decision of  February 26 2019 addressing Interest and Royalty Directive (C-115/16, 
C-118/16, C-119/16 y C-299/16), the beneficial owner would be used in the OECD technical sense 
in order to prevent specific abusive situations, in a way that leads the CJEU to distinguish in a clearer 
way the consequences derived from such clause (beneficial owner) if  compared with those that result 
from the general prohibition of  abuse (see: Haslehner and Kofler, “Three Observations on the Danish 
Beneficial Ownership cases”, Kluwer Tax Blog (KTB), April 2019).
4 The CJEU  declared that paragraph 4 of  art.º 1 of  the Directive 2003/49 corroborates the reference to 
economic reality by making the precision that a Member State company will be considered the beneficial 
owner of  the interest or royalties only if  it receives those payments for his own benefit and not in the 
capacity of  a conduit for another person, that is, as an agent or nominee; the concept of  beneficial owner 
concerns not a formally identified recipient, but rather the entity which benefits economically from the 
income received (interest, dividends and royalties) and, accordingly, has the power to freely determine 
the use to which it is put. Hence the CJEU seems to favour a factual analysis and not a strictly legal one. 
The concept of  beneficial owner as the one that operated by the CJUE is very marked by the concept of  
abuse and the artificial arrangement test, considering that what is the most relevant is that the recipient 
has the actual control over the use of  the income received “in terms of  substance”, through a contractual 
and factual analysis (see: CFE, “Opinion Statement ECJ-TF 2/2019 on the CJEU decisions of  26 
February 2019 un Cases C-15/16, C-118/16 and 299/16, N Luxemburg I et al, and cases C-116/16 
and C-117/17, T Denmark et al, concerning the beneficial ownership requirement and the anti-abuse 
principle in the company tax directives”, June 2019, p. 17, and 19). Nevertheless, in connection with the 
burden of  the proof  on the taxpayer, the latter cannot be forced to produce evidence when that is very 
difficult or almost impossible, sufficing that taxpayer gathers facts that prove that it is not bound by a 
contract to transfer that income and has enough powers to use and manage that income.
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h) the general principle that abusive practices are prohibited may be relied 
on against a person where that person invokes certain rules of  EU law providing 
for an advantage in a manner which is not consistent with the objectives of  those 
rules;  we are, therefore, in the presence of  an anti-abuse test that applies on a 
case-by-case basis and takes into account the facts and circumstances that relate 
to the case, to determine whether the attribution of  tax benefits derived from 
the Directive at stake (Parent/Subsidiary or Interest and Royalty Directive) is 
consistent with the purposes of  European law at hand, more than the strictly 
formal compliance of  the requirements set forward; it is important to note that 
the CJEU claims that this EU principle is diverse and independent from  similar 
domestic principles; as a consequence, even if  a Member State has not adopted a 
general anti-abuse rule embodied in an EU Directive, that does not result in there 
being no protection against abuse of  the Directives’ provisions.5  
i) the concept of  abusive practice adopted by the CJEU in the rulings under 
analysis appears broader in scope and somewhat more flexible than in previous 
decisions, notwithstanding the attempt to harmonise the new approach with the 
previous one (see Cadbury Schweppes, Polbud o Halifax, cases); thus, on the one 
hand, it points out that to permit the setting up of  financial arrangements whose 
sole aim is to benefit from the tax advantages resulting from the application of  
Directive 2003/49 would not be consistent with such objectives and, on the other 
hand, highlights the compatibility between the prohibition of  abuse and the right 
to the pursuit, by the taxpayer, of  the tax regime most favourable for him, in a 
way that cannot, as such, establish a general presumption of  fraud or abuse based 
on the purpose of  the transaction, considering that the prohibition of  abuse 
requires that objective and subjective requirements relating to the artificiality of  
the operations (lacking economic reality) are met, and that the purpose of  the 
rules applied is jeopardised;6
j) In relation to the elements that prove an abusive practice, the CJEU revisited 
its previous doctrine on the elements that should be observed and proved by tax 
authorities: 
a) objective element: objective circumstances in which, despite formal 
observance of  the conditions laid down by the EU rules, the purpose of  
those rules has not been achieved, and 
b) subjective element consisting in the intention to obtain an advantage from 
the EU (tax advantage) rules by artificially creating the conditions laid down 
for obtaining it; examination of  a set of  facts is, therefore, needed to establish 
whether the constituent elements of  an abusive practice are present, namely; 
5 That position advocated by the CJEU is consistent with preceding case law such as Italmoda (C-
131/13) or Cussens (C-251/16), and represents somewhat an overruling of  the doctrine conveyed by 
Kofoed  C-321/05 (see: CFE, “Opinion Statement ECJ-TF 2/2019 on the CJEU decisions of  26 
February 2019 un Cases C-15/16, C-118/16 and 299/16, N Luxemburg I et al, and cases C-116/16 
and C-117/17, T Denmark et al, concerning the beneficial ownership requirement and the anti-abuse 
principle in the company tax directives”, June 2019, p. 15-16). 
6 The fact that the ultimate beneficiary of  the interest and royalties benefits from the same tax regime 
it could have benefited in light of  a tax treaty concluded with the source state cannot be considered 
as a circumstance that, by itself, excludes the abuse of  EU law, according to the CJEU. The CJEU, 
however, acknowledges that such fact may be an indicium that such an arrangement was not artificial 
and had not mainly a tax purpose. The OECD seems to adopt a similar position in the example M of  
the commentaries (para. 182) to art.º 29.9 OECD Model Convention 2017.  
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“whether economic operators have carried out purely formal or artificial transactions devoid 
of  any economic and commercial justification, with the essential aim of  benefiting from an 
improper advantage”;7
k) the CJEU specified a set of  indicia (objective and consistent) which national 
tax authorities and courts should take into account when they have to determine 
the verification of  the above mentioned abusive practice elements, based on 
the analysis of  the circumstances present in each concrete situation; in relation 
to the indicia of  potential abusive practices, the CJEU referred to the following:8
a) Indicia of  the existence of  an arrangement intended to obtain 
improper entitlement to the exemption: the circumstance rests on the fact 
that the income (interest) is, very soon after its receipt, passed on by the 
company that has received it to entities which do not fulfil the conditions for 
the application of  Directive 2003/49; and
b) Indicia (objective and consistent) of  the existence of  an artificial 
arrangement (set up in an artificial manner in order to benefit from a tax 
advantage provided by EU law), namely: i) where the sole activity of  the 
recipient of  the interest is the receipt of  it and its transmission to the beneficial 
owner or to other conduit companies; ii) the absence of  economic activity of  
the entity, in light of  its specific features, inferred from an analysis of  several 
relevant factors (balance sheet, the structure of  its costs and expenditure 
actually incurred, the staff  that it employs and the premises and equipment 
that it has);  iii) the existence of  various intragroup contracts related to 
financial transactions with the aim of  transferring profits from a profit-
making commercial company to shareholding entities in order to avoid the 
tax burden or reduce it as much as possible,9  in particular when  the valuation 
of  the intermediary companies’ equity and the analysis of  the transactions 
shows instrumental companies’ inability to have economic use of  the income 
received based on those intragroup contracts.
l) the CJEU has also dealt with the “subject to tax and no exemption” 
requirement laid down in the Interest and Royalty Directive [Art.º 3(a)(iii)], 
determining that such requirement is not fulfilled  whenever the company at hand 
7 It is important to note that those operations or arrangements whose goal is to obtain a tax advantage 
consistent with the rules to be applied are not contrary to the EU Law, neither represent an abusive 
practice, in line with what was observed by the CJEU itself  (Halifax case) and the European legislator 
himself  [paragraph 11 of  foreword of  the 2016/1164 Directive, ATAD; see.: Calderon and Martín 
Jiménez, Derecho Tributario de la UE (Valencia: Ciss 2019), 374]. 
8 At the end of  the day, the CJEU case law represents a kind of  positive and negative guide on the 
existence of  abusive practices by intermediary companies. According to the perspective of  the negative 
guide results clear that “letter box companies” or mere “front subsidiaries” are examples of  artificiality 
(Cadbury, C-196/04); in light of  the positive perspective, the holding entity cannot be considered, 
in itself, an example of  abuse (Eqiom, C-6/16). The CJEU “Danish Cases» rulings bring about new 
situations where intermediary companies or conduits represent artificial arrangements (especially when 
that lack substance and economic reality),  but at the same time, we have to highlight, that this case law 
places many intermediary structures on the “grey zone”, considering that it will be necessary to verify on 
a case-by-case basis, according to an integrated approach, if  those structures that benefit from the EU 
Law have economic reality and, actually, operate (in similar terms see: B. Larking, “CJEU Decisions on 
Tax Avoidance and Conduits: More Questions than Answers”, 25 et seq.).
9 The CJEU in case N Luxembourg 1 seems to attribute relevance, as an abuse indicium, to the 
circumstance that the Company benefiting from interest makes “an insignificant taxable profit when it acts 
as a conduit company, in order to enable the flow of  funds from the debtor company to the entity which is the beneficial 
owner of  the sums paid” (para. 130). 
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(in the situation under analysis it was a Luxembourgish SICAR), irrespective of  
being subject to taxation and not exempt from corporate tax in the Member 
State involved, is not taxed for the interest it is paid.10 This interpretation of  the 
subject to  tax requirement covered by the Directive is controversial, considering 
that neither the beneficial owner’s status demands that the derived income is 
actually taxed, nor does the Interest and Royalty Directive put forward an actual 
taxation requirement in relation to the recipient of  income, except if  a permanent 
establishment is in place. The subject to tax and no exemption to corporate tax requirement 
(Art.º 3. a.iii of  the Interest and Royalty Directive) has been construed in a clear-
cut manner, in the sense that it is understood as a subjective, rather than an 
objective requirement; in fact, the Commission itself  made several proposals to 
modify the Directive, introducing a “subject-to-tax” requirement in relation  to the 
income.11 The CJEU adopted a not very clear interpretation of  the subject to tax 
and no exemption requirement, by excluding its application in situations such as the 
ones involving Luxembourg SICARs where interest was exempt. It is true that the 
CJEU has already made clear that the subjective tax liability with total income exemption 
is available to an entity subject to corporate tax and equates to a situation where 
the requirement laid down in the Parent-Subsidiary Directive (Art.º 2.a.iii)12 is 
met. As a result, the fact that the CJEU again, adopted  a similar interpretation of  
the subject-to-tax and no exemption requirement of  the Interest and Royalty Directive 
in the case N Luxembourg is not a total surprise, even though such an approach, 
based solely on a finalistic and extensive interpretation of  the Directive, has the 
potential to collide with requirements set out by the Directive itself. Hence, it seems 
the CJEU does not accept that subject-to-tax and not exempted of  corporate tax 
entities meet the requirements for the application of  the Directives under analysis, 
whenever those entities are fully exempted (such as the as the dividends paid 
by subsidiary to the parent) or whenever interest and royalties covered are fully 
exempted. From the decisions under scrutiny one cannot derive, though, that a 
requirement of  a minimum level of  actual taxation may be set out, considering 
that it would jeopardise the principle of  the autonomy of  Member States in the 
field of  direct taxation. Likewise, it seems also that a partial exemption applied to 
the tax base of  an entity (e.g. via Patent Box) in relation to the income (royalties) 
excludes the possibility of  applying the Directives.  We can neither say that the 
CJEU’s new approach to the subject-to-tax and no exemption requirement has probatory 
implications for the taxpayer which may be willing to benefit from the advantages 
provided by the Directives.
10 For a similar position see.: Haslehner and Kofler, “Three Observations on the Danish Beneficial 
Ownership cases”, Kluwer Tax Blogg, April 2019. 
11 See: CFE, “Opinion Statement ECJ-TF 2/2019 on the CJEU decisions of  26 February 2019 un 
Cases C-15/16, C-118/16 and 299/16, N Luxemburg I et al, and cases C-116/16 and C-117/17, T 
Denmark et al, concerning the beneficial ownership requirement and the anti-abuse principle in the 
company tax directives”, June 2019, pp. 21-22.
12 CJEU, March 8 of  2017, Wereldhave, C-448/15. It is not clear-cut how the mentioned no total exemption 
of  the entity requirement operates in the context of  the Parent/Subsidiary Directive when the Directive 
lays down overtly the exemption of  the dividends covered by its purview. It might happen that such 
participation exemption encompasses capital gains; we think that such partial objective exemption does 
not affect the application of  the Directive. 
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3. Remarks on the potential consequences of  the CJEU decisions
The CJEU established a new doctrine about the interpretation of  the concept of  
beneficial owner and abuse of  law in connection with the Parent and Subsidiary Directive 
and the Interest and Royalty payments Directive which converges with international 
standards (OECD) about beneficial owner and treaty shopping. 
However, there are some differences between the OECD approach and the EU 
law approach, in the sense that those legal contexts are ruled by different principles 
and rules which envisage heterogeneous purposes.13 Those differences may imply that, 
in certain situations, a tax treaty between the source State and the resident State of  the 
beneficial owner is applied rather than the Directives.14
In connection with what  argued above, it is important to highlight that in 
accordance with those treaties that follow the OECD Model Convention, the beneficial 
owner rule is not an anti-treaty shopping rule of  general scope, but simply a rule limited 
in scope. In fact, the OECD, both in a pre-BEPS and post-BEPS scenario, has 
acknowledged the limited purview of  the beneficial owner clause, considering that 
both domestic general anti-abuse rules and specific anti-abuse rules may be applied 
to avoid the abusive application of  tax treaties. It is interesting to notice, that BEPS 
Action 6 has not expanded  the scope of  the beneficial owner clause in order to curb 
the improper use of  tax treaties, having simply developed a minimum standard, based 
on other specific anti-abuse rules.15
As a result, the absence of  a beneficial owner in a tax treaty does not necessarily 
mean that the treaty in place becomes vulnerable to artificial arrangements leading 
to tax treaty abuse,  in the sense that other rules could be applied to neutralise those 
operations, as it is recognised by the OECD.16
Moreover, we cannot overlook how the OECD,  following the changes introduced 
in the 2003 OECD Model version aimed at “clarifying” and delimitating the scope of  
the application of  the beneficial owner concept, by taking into consideration the reports 
produced by the Tax Committee in 1986 and 2002  about this topic, and by adapting 
the application of  the beneficial owner rule to the  “CIVs” (“regulated open funds”) and 
“Non-CIVs” (hedge funds, private equity funds), through another series of  reports17.  The 
13 In connection with this, it is important to highlight how tax treaties and EU tax related Directives 
operate in different legal contexts and pursue heterogeneous goals, but also that the whole regulatory 
system they frame is consistent. The OECD has spelled out that situations related to intermediary 
holding companies operated by investment funds may not translate into abuse; the concept of  
beneficial owner is also framed in its scope by the relationship it has with CIV and non-CIVs funds. 
14 It is important to highlight that, as we have mentioned above, the CJEU seems to use the concept 
of  beneficial owner in an heterogeneous manner, considering that in the framework of  the Parent/ 
Subsidiary Directive said concept is more connected with general abusive situations resting on the 
idea of  simulation, whereas in the framework of  the Interest and Royalty Directive the focus is more 
specific and more linked with the technical sense OECD attributes to the concept of  beneficial owner.
15 The OECD OCDE/G20 Final Report regarding action 6 of  the BEPS Action Plan (Preventing the 
Granting of  Treaty Benefits in Inappropriate Circumstances, October 2015, p. 17-18 and 81) refers to the 
beneficial owner rule as an anti-treaty shopping measure. However, it does not introduce specific changes 
in that clause, probably because its scope, as an anti-abuse measure, was already exhausted.
16 See paragraph 12.5 of  the Commentaries to art.º 10 OECD Model Convention, and paragraphs 7-12 
of  the commentaries to art.º 1 of  2014 OECD Model Convention, including the specific reference to 
the beneficial owner rule as an anti-abuse provision similar to art.º 17.2 of  OECD Model Convention 
See: Martin Jiménez, “The 2003 Revision of  the OECD Commentaries on the Improper Use of  Tax 
Treaties: A Case for the declining effect of  the OECD Commentaries?”, BIT, January 2004, 17 et. seq.
17 OECD, The Granting of  Treaty Benefits with respect to the Income of  Collective Investment Vehicles, (OECD 
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OECD clarified further that the CIV vehicles (and with some variation the Non-CIVs) 
comply with the beneficial owner test, whenever the administrators of  the vehicle or entity 
(resident for the purposes of  Art.º 4 of  the OECDE MC) have discretionary powers 
to manage the assets generating income (beyond the powers of  a mere nominee or 
fiduciary or conduit for another person), in a way that even if  the statutes of  the entity 
set out a rule concerning the annual distribution of  income to the shareholders, that 
would not suffice to affect the beneficial owner status. Those circumstances should be 
analysed on a case-by-case basis according to the legal perspective of  the residence state 
of  the entities receiving the income.18 The problems emerging from the application of  
nti-treaty shopping rules (Principal Purpose Test/PPT, Limitation of  Benefits clause/
LOB) to these entities or investment vehicles are diverse, though.19
2010), OECD Public Discussion drafts, Clarification of  the meaning of  the beneficial owner in the OECD 
Model Tax Convention, drafts 2011 & 2012, enclosed in the 2014 OECDE MC of  2014 commentaries), 
and OECD, Draft of  Non-CIVs Examples (OECD BEPS, Action 6, January 2017) enclosed in the 2017 
OCDE MC.
18 See the OECD CIV Report 2010 (currently enclosed in the commentaries to art.º 1 of  2017 MC 
OECD MC, paragraphs 28 et. seq.) which determines that CIVs should be considered beneficial owners 
in relation to the income they obtain (dividends, interest, capital gains) whenever a set of  requirements 
is met: a) CIV entity should qualify as a resident in the contracting State where it is established; and b) 
the managers of  the CIV should have discretionary powers to manage the assets generating income, and 
to control the decisions related to the investments made. The fact that the statutes of  these investment 
vehicles set out a contractual or legal obligation of  distributing the yield of  the investment should not 
be seen as excluding the application of  the beneficial owner rule, every time OECD deems we are in 
the presence of  a “disconnected obligation” of  the income generated, in the source state, by the CIV. In 
connection with this, OECD clarified, through the commentaries introduced in 2014 in the OECD 
Model Convention, that the requirement related to the obligation of  transferring the income to which 
the beneficial owner rule refers should be deemed as referring to certain specific income flows, and not 
to the global financial return obtained by a CIV. The report considers, therefore, that the funds with a 
broad base of  investments (CIVs & hedge funds) of  a general type qualify as beneficial owners for the 
purpose of  arts.10-13 of  tax treaties OECD Model based. In the case of  the Non-CIVs (private equity 
funds) things are more complex, especially when the investment base is narrow. Consequently, the key 
to verify that the beneficial owner requirement was met relates to exercising discretionary powers over 
investments made, the management of  those investments (including disinvestment) and the submission 
of  evidence of  the economic and operational functionality of  the entity, so that it results proved that 
said entity does not operate as mere conduit without powers over the future use of  the income generated 
by the assets of  said entity. See, on this issue: T. Chew, “The Application of  Tax Treaties to CIVs: 
Beneficial Owner Requirement Explained?”, Derivatives & Financial Instruments, nº 6 (2015); Lawson, 
“Treaty Entitlement of  Funds in the Post-BEPS World”, in Investment Fund Taxation, ed. Hashlener, 
(Trevose, PA: Kluwer, 2018), oo.260 et seq.; and M. Merten, “Taxation of  Investment Funds Following 
the OECD BEPS Initiative I”, BIT, February 2019, 76 et seq.
19 We think that the OECD Report (Action 6 Final Report: Public discussion draft on non-CIV Examples, 
OECD 2017), whose main conclusions were included in the commentary to art.º 29 of  2017 OCDE 
MC, represents an attempt by OECD to protect the private equity sector from an automatic application 
of  the PPT (principal purpose test) clause that would stop tax treaties from being applied to vehicles 
or intermediary entities of  investment used by that sector;  as a result, the OECD claims that the 
application of  the PPT in that context should be based on a fact and circumstance analysis and not on 
a general and pre-set conclusion that those vehicles have a mainly a tax purpose and that the application 
of  tax treaties is contrary to the object and purpose of  those treaties. Those examples are, therefore, 
mere illustrations of  bona fide situations in which the inherent tax advantages are considered compatible 
with the object and purpose of  the tax treaties. Those examples, however, do not set a bona fide standard 
that excludes them from the application of  the PPT, neither lay down a minimum economic substance 
or a closed list of  valid commercial motives. We consider that those examples do not succeed in terms 
of  bringing clarity to the issue, and therefore, do not favour the development of  investments done by 
funds using that type of  vehicles, which, in a way, contrasts with purposes of  tax treaties. See: Kuijk and 
Haarsma, “Reflections on the OECD´s Non-CIV Fund Examples”, Derivatives & Financial Instruments, 
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It is important to highlight that the beneficial owner clause, in light of  OECD’s 
perspective, disregards the asset owner (e.g., shares, credit rights or intangibles) putting 
the emphasis on the control over the income derived from the asset or right.20 Likewise, 
the mere majoritarian or total control of  the company recipient of  the income, by any 
means, stops that company from being considered as a beneficial owner. However, the 
application of  an economic substance test,  as an adjuvant criterion to determine if  
the recipient of  income is a beneficial owner – although utilised in some jurisdictions 
in Asia, such as China21 – is not covered by the content of  that rule; even though 
that economic substance test is relevant for the application of  measures tackling 
“conduit companies” or treaty shopping (such as Limitation of  Benefits clauses and the Principal 
Purpose test clause).22 Moreover, the absence of  double non taxation or actual taxation of  
beneficial owner’s income is not a requirement that must be met in order for an entity 
to be considered as such (a beneficial owner) and the tax treaty to be applied.
Despite the differences pointed out above between the OECD anti-abuse 
principles relating to tax treaties application and the CJEU doctrine on “Directive 
Shopping”, we have to acknowledge that  CJEU rulings on the “Danish cases” (despite 
the differences between the decisions)23 should be read by tax authorities as making 
a case for the reinforcement of  an extensive application of  anti-abuse principles that 
sustains a stricter enforcement not only in relation to the requirements for the application 
of  Parent/Subsidiary Directive and Interest and Royalty Directive, but also in relation 
to Tax treaties, in relation to situations that involve intermediary holding companies.24
It is important to observe that if  those intermediary holding companies have 
an adequate level of  operative and functional substance evinced by their commercial 
reality, they should not be negatively affected by this anti-abuse doctrine.25 Nevertheless, 
we cannot, overlook the implications of  a supposedly latent “beneficiary owner” clause, 
especially in the context of  intermediary holding structures.26 
nº 6 (2017).
20 2014 OECD Model Convention highlighted the relevance of  having the beneficial owner entitled 
to the right of  “use and enjoyment” over the obtained income, not limited by a legal or contractual 
obligation of  transferring the income to another person (paragraph 4.3 of  the commentaries to art.º 
12 of  2014 OECD MC 2014). 
21 Qiu, D, “The concept of  beneficial ownership in China´s tax treaties”, BIT, February 2013.
22 See: Jain, Prebble and Bunting, “Conduit companies, beneficial ownership, and the test of  substantive 
business activity in claims for relief  under double tax treaties”, eJournal of  Tax Research, vol. 11, nº 3 
(2013): 408-412.
23 We are addressing especially to the distinct CJEU doctrine on the beneficial owner in the context of  
Parent/Subsidiary Directive and Interest and Royalty Directive (see footnote nº 3).
24 In fact, the authorities of  some Member States have acknowledge that the CJEU case law on 
the concept of  abusive tax practice (considered in a global way and not the one emerging from the 
“Danish cases” alone) may have some impact on the application of  conventional anti-abuse rules, 
irrespectively of  the difference in terms of  legal context (tax treaties and tax Directives set forward 
different anti-abuse rules and represent different systems with heterogeneous purposes) and the fact 
taxa administrations have to analyse (EY, “Dutch Secretary of  Finance shares views on impact of  
CJEU Danish cases to anti-abuse provisions in Dutch dividend withholding tax and corporate income 
tax”, Global Tax Alert, June 19, 2019).
25 Along the same lines: A. Iannaccone, “T-Danmark: A Milestone of  CJEU Decision on Abuse of  
the Parent-Subsidiary Directive”, TNI, June 24, 2019, 1361; y Bieber and Plowgian, “BEPS for Asset 
management”, KPMG Tax Flash, July 3, 2019.
26 See what was said in footnote nº 3 about when the company receiving the dividends is not the 
beneficial owner of  those dividends for the purpose of  the application of  art.º 5 of  the Parent/
ubsidiary Directive. 
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In a nutshell, the application of  the “Danish cases” CJEU case law by tax authorities 
and national courts may bring about, not only an expansion of  the concept of  potential 
abusive arrangements but also affect the burden of  proof, requiring a broader “factual” 
analysis of  the abusive practice, in light of  a set of  abuse indicia that may be present in 
each situation. It is likely that this type of  analysis and the emphasis it gives to different 
indicia will intensify the levels of  legal uncertainty and tax risks associated with cross-
border investment operations and arrangements.27
In connection with this, it is important to stress that the analysis of  the application 
of  benefits derived from Directives or Tax treaties should continue to be based on 
facts and circumstances present in each case, and should neither allow the mentioned 
“Danish cases” rulings to serve as an argument to presume that an abusive situation is in 
place, nor change the need for tax authorities to analyse the conditions present in each 
situation or arrangements, in a case-by-case (and global) basis.
Despite of  what we have observed, it seems apparent that the anti-abuse rulings 
emerging from the “Danish cases”, the same way the  “principal purpose test”  laid out in 
BEPS Action 6 and embodied in tax treaties through the Multilateral Instrument for 
BEPS Tax Treaty related measures (MLI) or bilateral agreements such as Protocols 
(or new treaties), further intensifies  the level of  legal uncertainty , in the sense that it 
blurs the divide between legitimate situations and those that can be considered abusive, 
generating, as a result, a “chilling-effect”  in relation to those investments made by “non-
CIV funds”.28
In connection with what was said, we think the Commission and the tax authorities 
themselves could develop a “practical guide” in which the main criteria to determine 
when the EU Tax Directives or tax treaties would legitimately apply would be compiled 
in an open and generic manner, in order to reduce the high level of  legal uncertainty, 
which constitutes a major hurdle to bona fide investments.
In spite of  what was said, we have to stress that “the Danish cases” cannot be 
taken separately or in an insulated way from the series of  the CJEU cases dealing 
with principles applied to the prevention of  abusive tax practices (e.g., Halifax, 
Cadbury Schweppes, Denkavit,  Equiom, Deister Holding & Juhler Holding, GS, 
amongst other)29 and neither can they be construed as establishing a presumption of  
intermediary holding companies constituting abusive arrangements to which Parent/
Subsidiary Directive and Interest and Royalty Directive do not apply. Likewise, that 
case law cannot be extrapolated in an automatic way to tax treaties or other instruments 
(e.g., Bilateral/Multilateral Investment Treaties), which are ruled by distinct principles 
and pursue different goals.
27 Along the same lines: Hoor, “Danish Court´s Questions on Beneficial Ownership”, Bloomberg Tax, 
May 8, 2019; y McLoughlin, “CJEU Beneficial Ownership Cases Could Spawn Varying Approaches”, 
TNI, April 22, 2019, 361 ss.
28 Gagnon advocates a similar position (“Traveling without a Destination: Post-BEPS Anti-Treaty-
Shopping Rules and Non-CIV Funds in Canada and the US”, TNI, September 4, 2017, 987), in 
relation to PPT and its impact an investments made through private equity vehicles, bringing the 
attention to the commentaries on large investment funds, such as Blackrock.
29 In connection with these rulings, see: Calderón and Martín, Derecho Tributario de la UE, 228 et seq.
